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Abstract
We study the equilibrium properties, including stability, of discrete-space
social interaction models with a single type of agents, and their continuous
limit. We show that, even though the equilibrium in discrete space can be non-
unique for all finite degree of discretization, any sequence of discrete-space
models’ equilibria converges to the continuous-space model’s unique equilib-
rium as the discretization of space is refined. Showing the existence ofmultiple
equilibria resorts to the stability analysis of equilibria. A general framework
for studying equilibria and their stability is presented by characterizing the
discrete-space social interaction model as a potential game.
JEL classification: C62; C72; C73; D62; R12
Keywords: Social interaction; Agglomeration; Discrete space; Potential game;
Stability; Evolutionary game theory.
1 Introduction
Beckmann’s (1976) social interaction model has been an important benchmark
for the study of spatial agglomeration. Considering the fact that face-to-face com-
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munications are important to understand the mechanisms behind spatial distribu-
tions of economic activities, Beckmann presents a model in which people aiming
to interact with others choose their locations. People can save the costs of inter-
actions by locating close to one other, but agglomeration causes congestion such
as increases in housing prices. Equilibrium population distributions, which are of
interest to this paper, emerge as a result of the trade-o between the positive and
negative eects of agglomeration. This type of model has been of particular inter-
est for urban economists because the location of an urban center is not specified a
priori unlike classical urban models such as the monocentric city model.1
Beckmann (1976) considers social interactions among households for a linear
city that is represented by a real line. After Beckmann’s work, Tabuchi (1986) and
Mossay and Picard (2011) also consider social interactions among a single type of
agents on the real line.2 All of these studies attain symmetric unimodal population
distributions as unique equilibria. The uniqueness result is compelling, and the
shape of the equilibrium distribution is intuitively reasonable. Moreover, this is
also a good news for policy makers because they do not have to worry about
multiple equilibria when internalizing externalities.
Having said that, although the results attained in continuous-space models
serve as an important theoretical benchmark, it is also important to study whether
those results are robust in terms of the discretization of space. In particular, if we
would like to empirically test the model, we would have to discretize it. Empirical
works cannot invoke the uniqueness result of the continuous-space model, unless
we can view the continuous-space model as the limit of discrete-space models in
regard to the size of geographical zones. This paper provides a positive answer to
this issue for a social interaction model having a single type of agents.
There are few papers on spatial social interactions using a discrete-spacemodel.
Anas and Xu (1999) present a multi-regional general equilibrium model in which
every region employs labor and produces goods. Although the technology exhibits
a constant return to scale, the goods are dierentiated over regions and consumers
1See, for example, Section 3.3 of Fujita and Thisse (2013).
2Mossay and Picard (2011) consider consumers, whereas Tabuchi (1986) considers firms. Besides
models on the real line, O’Hara (1976) considers the social interactions of firms in a square city,
and Borukhov and Hochman (1977) consider the social interactions of consumers in a circular city.
They also obtain a symmetric unimodal distribution as a unique equilibrium. In Borukhov and
Hochman (1977), though, the cost of social interaction is not weighted by population density, so
social interactions do not cause any externality.
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travel to each region to purchase them, which yields an agglomeration force in
the central region.3 Although their model is useful for the evaluation of urban
policies, they rely entirely on numerical simulations, forcing us to consider par-
ticular equilibrium that might be unstable in case of multiple equilibria. Turner
(2005) and Caruso et al. (2009) consider one-dimensional discrete-space location
models with neighborhood externalities in the sense that utility at a particular lo-
cation depends on the population distribution of that neighborhood.4 Caruso et
al. (2009) rely on numerical simulations, while Turner (2005) generically attains a
unique equilibrium outcome by considering an extreme type of neighborhood ex-
ternalities wherein an individual located between vacant neighborhoods receives
a bonus. However, because they focus on the eects of residential locations on
open spaces, they abstract away from the endogenous determination of an urban
center, although this remains an important feature of the model in which we are
interested.5 Moreover, we emphasize that none of the above works studies the
relationship between continuous- and discrete-space models.
In this paper, we consider social interactions among consumers in the discrete
space in which a finite number of cities are evenly distributed on a line segment,
and we study the properties of equilibria accordingly. To this end, we begin with
writing the model for a general quasi-linear utility function, invoking the fact
that our model of location choice can be described as a potential game (Monderer
and Shapley, 1996).6 One important consequence of being a potential game is
that the equilibrium can be characterized with a finite-dimensional optimization
problem. Indeed, by assuming that the pair-wise interaction cost between cities is
symmetric, we can identify a function, which is called a potential function, so that
the set of equilibria coincides exactlywith the set of Kurash-Kuhn-Tucker points for
the maximization problem of the function. Moreover, even if multiple equilibria
arise, we can conduct stability analysis with the potential function. In fact, we
recognize the fact that every local maximizer of the potential function is a stable
3Braid (1988) considers a five-townmodel having a similar structure, although he abstracts away
fromgeneral equilibriumeects. He shows that, depending on the degree of product dierentiation,
the equilibrium firm distribution can be bimodal.
4Caruso et al. (2007) considers a two-dimensional discrete space.
5Moreover, they make the so-called open-city assumption in which the equilibrium utility level
is exogenous, whereas the total city population is endogenous.
6The potential function approach has been recognized as a promising analytical tool for regional
science (Fujita and Thisse, 2013). See Oyama (2009a, b) and Fujishima (2013) for applications of the
potential game approach to geography models.
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equilibrium under a broad class of myopic evolutionary dynamics. Note that the
stability of equilibria has not been addressed in continuous-space models.7 The
discretization of space reduces the dimension of stability analysis and enables us
to scrutinize the properties of equilibria more closely.
After the general characterization of equilibria and their stability above, we
focus on adiscrete version ofMossay andPicard’s (2011)model to have a closer look
at equilibrium properties. Because the utility function is linear in city populations
under their model, it is possible to obtain analytical results regarding equilibrium
properties for an arbitrary number of cities.8 As we mentioned above, we study
the relationship of equilibrium properties between discrete and continuous spaces.
In particular, we increase the number of cities while the total size of location space
remains fixed, andwe study the limiting properties of equilibria. We show that any
sequence of the discrete-space model’s equilibria converges to the equilibrium of
the continuous-space model as the number of cities goes to infinity, or the distance
between adjacent cities vanishes. Thismeans that the set of equilibria is continuous
in the number of cities at their limit because equilibrium in a continuous space is
unique. Therefore, we may think that, as long as the number of geographical
zones is suciently large, any equilibria of discrete-space model are close to the
equilibrium of the limiting continuous-space model.
We claim that this result merits attention because the equilibrium in discrete
space is generally not unique. We show that, as long as the interaction cost is not too
small, the equilibrium is essentially non-unique in the sense that equilibria having
dierent numbers of populated cities coexist. In particular, we can pin down a
range of the interaction costs where multiple equilibria arise for any finite number
of cities. Our result regarding the connection between discrete- and continuous-
space models implies that, even if there weremultiple equilibria, all of themwould
converge to a single equilibrium as discretization is refined.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces a general class of social
interactionmodels, characterizing this class as a potential game. Section 3 examines
theuniqueness and stability of equilibria. Section 4 studies the connections between
discrete- and continuous-space models by increasing the number of cities. Section
7Naturally, continuous-spacemodels are not always free from the problemofmultiple equilibria,
as we will discuss in the concluding remarks.
8Tabuchi (1982) considers the same class of discrete-space social interaction model, though he
studies only the social planner’s problem.
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5 concludes the paper. Proofs omitted in the main text are provided in Appendix.
2 The Model
We start with a general class of discrete-space social interaction models that
includes thediscrete-space analogueofBeckmann’s (1976) andMossay andPicard’s
(2011) models as special cases. This description allows us to illustrate how the
potential function approach generally works for the equilibrium characterization
and stability analysis of discrete-space social interaction models.
2.1 Basic Assumptions
We consider a region in which K cities are evenly distributed on a line segment
normalized as the unit interval [0; 1]. Cities are labeled by i 2 S  f1; 2;    ;Kg in
order of distance from location 0, and city i’s location is xi  1K

i   12

2 [0; 1]. Each
city has the same amount of land A=K so that the total amount of land in the region
is fixed at A regardless of the number of cities. See Figure 1 for the structure of this
region. As is common in the literature, the land is owned by absentee landlords.
The opportunity cost of land is normalized to zero.
Figure 1: The regional structure
There are a unit mass of identical consumers in this region. Let ni 2 [0; 1] be
the mass of consumers in city i and let  
n
n = (n1;    ;nK) 2 RK+ :
PK
i=1 ni = 1
o
denote the set of consumers’ spatial distributions. Each consumer travels to every
other consumer for social interaction. In each city, they have the same preference
ui(zi; yi) for residential land yi and for the composite good zi which is chosen as
the nume´raire. Given land rent ri and population distribution n 2 , the utility
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maximization problem of consumers in city i is expressed as
max
zi;yi
n
ui(zi; yi) j zi + riyi + Ti(n)  Y; i 2 S
o
; (1)
where ri denotes the land rent in city i and Y is the fixed income. Ti(n) is the total
cost of traveling to other consumers from city i, which is defined as
Ti(n)  
KX
j=1
di jn j; (2)
where di j denotes the travel cost from city i to j. We assume that D = (di j) fulfills
the following four conditions: (i) dii = 0 for all i 2 S; (ii) di j = d ji for any i; j 2 S;
(iii) D is conditionally negative definite; and (iv) di j + d jk  dik for any i < j < k.9
In the terminology of spatial statistics, the first three conditions imply that di j is
an isotropic variogram. This class of travel costs includes the exponential cost
(di j = ejxi x jj   1) and the linear cost (di j = jxi   x jj), both of which are commonly
assumed in the literature of spatial interaction.
The utility function ui(zi; yi) is assumed to be quasi-linear:
ui(zi; yi) = zi + fi(yi); (3)
where fi(x) is a strictly increasing, concave, and twice dierentiable function for
x > 0. We also assume that limx!0 f 0i (x) = 1. Note that fi can be city-specific. If
fi(x) =  ln x [resp. fi(x) =   2x ] where  > 0 is a constant, we obtain the discrete-
space analogue of Beckmann’s (1976) [resp. Mossay and Picard’s (2011)] model.
2.2 Spatial Equilibrium and Potential Games
Having elaborated the structure of the model, we will now define the equilib-
rium. Becauseourmodel includes the location choice of consumers, the equilibrium
conditions require that a consumer chooses a city that gives him the highest utility,
in addition to choosing an optimal allocation in his city.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a collection of allocations (zi ; y

i )
K
i=1, land rents (r

i )
K
i=1,
9An n nmatrixM is conditionally negative definite if x0Mx < 0 for all x 2 Rn such thatPni=1 xi = 0.
See, e.g., Bapat and Raghavan (1997) for properties of conditionally negative definite matrices.
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and a population distribution n 2  such that
1. Given ri and n
 2 , (zi ; yi ) solves problem (1) for all i 2 S;
2. For all i 2 S, the land market clears whenever ni > 0;
3. Given (ri )
K
i=1 and n
 2 , no one has incentive to change his location. That is, there
exists u 2 R such that8>>><>>>:u
 = ui(zi ; y

i ) if n

i > 0;
u  ui(zi ; yi ) if ni = 0;
8i 2 S: (4)
In particular, we call an equilibrium population distribution n 2  a spatial equi-
librium. Under the quasi-linear utility function specified in (3), the first-order
condition for the utility maximization problem (1) is
f 0i (yi)  ri 8i 2 S; (5)
where the equality holdswhenever yi > 0. However, because themarginal utility of
residential land is infinity at yi = 0 by assumption, we must have yi > 0. Therefore,
f 0i (yi) = ri for all i 2 S. For yi > 0, let gi( f 0i (yi)) be the inverse function of f 0i (yi) (i.e.,
gi( f 0i (yi)) = yi).
10 Then, gi(ri) is the per-capita demand for the residential land in
city i, and the indirect utility of consumers in city i is
vi(ri;Y   Ti(n))  max
zi;yi
n
ui(zi; yi) j zi + riyi + Ti(n)  Y; i 2 S
o
= Y   Ti(n)   rigi(ri) + fi(gi(ri)):
(6)
The equilibrium land rent is determined so that the land market clears, as long
as consumers are willing to pay more than the opportunity cost of land that is
assumed to be zero. Let r¯i be the land rent at which the total demand nigi(ri) of the
residential land in city i is equal to the total land supply A=K. Then,
ri = maxfr¯i; 0g 8i 2 S: (7)
If r¯i < 0, land is used for non-residential purpose, and we necessarily have yi = 0.
However, it follows from ri = f 0i (yi) > 0 that this does not occur. Therefore, the
10From the assumption that f (x) is a strictly increasing function, the inverse function exists for
x > 0.
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equilibrium condition (7) reduces to
gi(ri ) =
A
niK
8i 2 S: (8)
Let
hi(ni) = fi
 A
niK

  A
niK
f 0i
 A
niK

: (9)
Because ri = f 0i (
A
niK
), this is the net utility from land consumption. The argument
above then leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. n 2  is a spatial equilibrium if and only if there exists v 2 R such that8>>><>>>:v
 = vi(n) if ni > 0;
v  vi(n) if ni = 0;
8i 2 S; (10)
where vi(n) is the indirect utility function in city i defined by
vi(n)  vi

f 0i
 A
niK

;Y   Ti(n)

= Y   Ti(n) + hi(ni): (11)
Writing the indirect utilities in a vector form, we have
v(n)  (vi(n))Ki=1 = Y1   T(n) + h(n) (12)
where T(n) = (Ti(n))Ki=1(= Dn), h(n) = (hi(ni))
K
i=1, and 1 is a vector of ones with an ap-
propriate dimension. People prefer to agglomerate to reduce the social interaction
costs that are summarized by T(n). On the other hand, people prefer to disperse
and avoid the congestion from land consumption that is summarized by h(n) be-
cause h0i (ni) =
A2
n3i K
2 f 00i (
A
niK
) < 0. As we will see, a spatial equilibrium is attained as
a result of tradeos between the agglomeration force represented by T(n) and the
dispersion force represented by h(n).
In what follows, to characterize spatial equilibria and their stability, we invoke
the properties of a potential game that is introduced byMonderer and Shapley (1996).
Note that, because we are interested in the spatial equilibrium, our model may be
viewed as a game in which the set of players is [0; 1], the (common) action set is
S, and the payo vector is (vi)Ki=1 by Lemma 1.
11 Moreover, as is evident from the
11A game with a continuum of anonymous players is called a population game (Sandholm, 2001).
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definition, a spatial equilibrium is actually a Nash equilibrium of the game. Thus,
let us denote our game by G = (vi)Ki=1. We then define that G is a potential game if
(vi)Ki=1 allows for a continuously dierentiable functionW such that
@W(n)
@ni
  @W(n)
@n j
= vi(n)   v j(n) 8n 2 ;8i; j 2 S (13)
where W is defined on an open set containing  so that its partial derivative is
well-defined on . If the condition above holds,W is called a potential function.
Suppose, for the moment, that G is a potential game with the potential function
W. As mentioned in the introduction, the equilibria of a potential game are charac-
terized with the optimization problem of an associated potential function. Indeed,
let us consider the following problem:
max
n2
W(n): (14)
Let  be a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
PK
i=1 ni = 1. Then, the first-order
condition is @W(n)@ni   where the equality holds whenever ni > 0. Then, by (13), we
have vi(n) = v j(n) for any populated cities i and j, and vk(n)  vi(n) if nk = 0 and
ni > 0. Therefore, n is a spatial equilibrium. By similar reasoning, it follows that the
converse is also true.12 That is, if n is a spatial equilibrium, it satisfies the necessary
condition for problem (14). Therefore, the equilibrium set of G exactly coincides with
the set of Kurash-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) points of problem (14).
The necessary and sucient condition for the existence of a potential function
is the triangular integrability (see, e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988), which, in our
model, is stated as
di j + d jk + dki = dik + dkj + d ji for any i; j; k 2 S: (15)
Recall that our travel costs are pair-wise symmetric (i.e., di j = d ji for any i; j 2 S).
Hence, the condition above necessarily holds, and our game is a potential game.
Indeed, the following lemma explicitly constructs a potential function for (vi)Ki=1.
In our game, players are anonymous in that the payo depends on only strategy distributions.
12See Proposition 3.1 of Sandholm (2001).
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Lemma 2. G is a potential game with the potential function
W(n)  W1(n) +W2(n) (16)
where
W1(n) =  
I
T(n0)dn0 =  1
2
KX
i=1
KX
j=1
di jnin j; (17)
W2(n) =
I
h(n0)dn0 =
KX
i=1
ni fi
 A
niK

: (18)
H
denotes the line integral over a path in  connecting 0 to n. Because di j = d ji for
any i; j 2 S, it is guaranteed that the line integrals are path-independent.
Observe that, in our potential game, we can recognize the tradeo between
centrifugal and centripedal forces as the tradeo between the concavity and con-
vexity of the potential function. Indeed, W2 is strictly concave because fi’s are
strictly concave, whereas W1 is quasiconvex because D is nonnegative and condi-
tionally negative definite.13 If the concavity of W2 dominates so that W is strictly
concave, a dispersed population distribution (i.e., an interior point in ) is attained
as a unique equilibrium. On the other hand, if the convexity of W1 dominates,
equilibrium population distributions would be more agglomerated. Therefore,W1
represents the centripedal force whereasW2 represents the centrifugal force.
2.3 Stability
2.3.1 Adjustment Dynamics
We are interested in the stability of equilibria particularly because our model
generally includes multiple equilibria, as shown in the next section. Specifically,
we are interested in whether we can justify an equilibrium through the existence of
a learning process that makes players settle down in their equilibrium strategies.
In this paper, we describe players’ learning process with an evolutionary dynamics,
or a (set-valued) dynamical system V that maps population distribution n0 2  to
13See, for example, Theorem 4.4.6 of Bapat and Raghavan (1997).
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a set of Lipschitz paths in  that starts from n0.14 Although we usually consider
a specific evolutionary dynamics for stability analysis, we will see that a more
general analysis is possible due to the existence of a potential function. That is,
the stability of equilibria can be characterized under a broad class of dynamics. In
particular, we consider the class of admissible dynamics defined below:
Definition 2. An evolutionary dynamics V is admissible for G = (vi)Ki=1 if for almost all
t  0 and for all n0 2 , it satisfies the following conditions:
(PC) n˙(t) , 0) n˙(t)  v(n(t)) > 0 for all n(  ) 2 V(n0),
(NS) n˙(t) = 0) n(t) is a Nash equilibrium of G for all n(  ) 2 V(n0).
To interpret condition (PC), which is called positive correlation, we rewrite it as
n˙(t)  v(n(t)) =
KX
i=1
n˙i(t)
0BBBBBB@vi(n(t))   1K
KX
j=1
v j(n(t))
1CCCCCCA : (19)
In general, it would be reasonable to expect that each term in the summation
over i is positive: if the payo from city i is higher than the average payo (i.e.,
vi(n(t))   1K
PK
j=1 v j(n(t)) > 0), then the mass of consumers choosing city i should
increase (i.e., n˙i(t) > 0), and vice versa. Condition (PC) only requires that this
be true in the aggregate. Therefore, in learning periods, it is possible that the
mass of consumers choosing city i increases even though it yields a less-than-
average payo. Condition (NS), which is called Nash stationary, states that if there
is a profitable deviation, some consumers change their locations. Under condition
(PC), the converse is also true.15 Therefore, under conditions (PC) and (NS), n˙(t) = 0
if and only if n(t) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Specific examples of admissible dynamics include the best response dynamics
(Gilboa and Matsui, 1991), the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamics (Brown,
1950), and the projection dynamics (Dupuis, 1993).16 One important remark is that
the replicator dynamics (Taylor, 1978), which is often used in spatial economicmodels
(e.g., Fujita et al., 1999), isnot admissible. Under the replicator dynamics, a rest point
14Considering a general dynamical system allows us to include set-valued dynamics such as the
best-response dynamics which is important from the game-theoretic point of view.
15See Proposition 4.3 of Sandholm (2001).
16See Sandholm (2005) for more examples.
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is always attained on the boundary, but the boundary points are not always Nash
equilibria. Thus, condition (NS) does not hold under the replicator dynamics.17
2.3.2 Stability Condition of Equilibrium
The admissible dynamics are closely connected to the potential function, and
thereby to the stability of Nash equilibria. Given a dynamics, we say that a pop-
ulation distribution n 2  is stable if there exists a neighborhood U   of n such
that n(t)! n for any trajectory n(  ) of the dynamics with n(0) 2 U. In particular, if
we can consider  for U, n is globally stable. n 2  is unstable if it is not stable.
To understand how the admissible dynamics are related to the potential func-
tion, let us consider our game G = (vi)Ki=1 with the potential function W given by
(18). Note that, by conditions (PC) and (NS), any trajectory n(  ) of an admissi-
ble dynamics monotonically ascends the potential function until it reaches a Nash
equilibrium because
W˙(n(t)) =
KX
i=1
@W(n(t))
@ni
n˙i(t) =
KX
i=1
vi(n(t))n˙i(t) > 0 (20)
whenever n˙(t) , 0.18 Therefore, if Nash equilibrium n does not locally maximize
W, we can perturb n so that the trajectory ascends W and goes away from the
equilibrium. In other words, assuming that each Nash equilibrium is isolated, a
Nash equilibrium is stable under any admissible dynamics if and only if it locally maximizes
an associated potential function.19 Therefore, if a game has a potential function, we
can characterize the stability of equilibria under admissible dynamics by looking
at the shape of the potential function.
2.4 Examples
We illustrate the potential function approach through examples. We consider
two models: Beckmann’s (1976) model in which fi(x) =  ln x and Mossay and
Picard’s (2011) model in which fi(x) =   2x . We assume K = 3,  = A = 4, and
17The replicator dynamics belongs to the class of strict myopic adjustment dynamics due to Swinkels
(1993) where Nash stationary is not imposed.
18Recall that n˙(t) = 0 if and only if n(t) is a Nash equilibrium.
19See Sandholm (2001) for a formal argument about this.
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di j = jxi   x jj. Thus, the total number of cities is three. Under these parameter
values, Figures 3 and 2 depict contour plots of each model’s potential function,
respectively. In these figures, the background color represents the value of potential
function: regions where the value is largest are red, while regions where the value
is smallest are blue. To characterize equilibria with these figures, we invoke the
fact that a local maximizer of potential function is a stable equilibrium, whereas
any other KKT points are unstable equilibria.
Looking at Figure 2, we can see that, when  = 0:4, the potential function is
strictly concave, and thus there exists a unique interior equilibrium that is sta-
ble. However, when  = 2:0, the potential function fails to be concave, and five
equilibria arise while the interior equilibrium vanishes. Stable equilibria are full
agglomerations in which only one city is populated. Looking at Figure 3, we can
see that equilibria of Beckmann’s model exhibit qualitatively similar properties to
those of Mossay and Picard’s model.20 In the next section, we analytically study
equilibrium properties while mostly focusing on Mossay and Picard’s model.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Instability of Population Distributions
In view of the previous section, we investigate the relationship between inter-
action cost  and the instability of spatial equilibria. We elaborate this point by
obtaining a sucient condition under which a population distribution could not
be stable even if it were a spatial equilibrium.
Let n 2  be a spatial equilibrium such that supp n = L  S where supp n is
the support of n (i.e., supp n = fi 2 S : ni > 0g). We denote the cardinality of L
by jLj. Because a stable spatial equilibrium locally maximizes potential function
W, we may investigate its Hessian H, while we have to consider the fact that
trajectories of admissible dynamics stay in . To this end, let GL be the matrix of
the active constraints’ gradients corresponding to L. For example, if L = S n f1g,
GL =
  1 1  1 1 0  0 0, where the prime means the transpose of matrix, because the active
constraints are
PK
i=1 ni = 1 and  n1  0. Let ZL be a GL’s null-space matrix. Then,
20However, two models’ bifurcation patterns might not completely be identical. Although the
case of three equilibria in which having two populated cities is stable exists for Mossay and Picard’s
model, such a case could not be found for Beckmann’s model in our numerical exercises.
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
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
 

(a)  = 0:4 (b)  = 2:0
Figure 2: Contour plot of the potential function ofMossay-Picard’smodel (: stable,
: unstable)


0.0
0.0 1.0
1.0


0.0
0.0 1.0
1.0
(a)  = 1 (b)  = 10
Figure 3: Contour plot of the potential function of Beckmann’s model (: stable, :
unstable)
the second-order necessary condition implies that n does not locally maximize W
if HL  Z0LHZL is not negative semi-definite, and this boils down to showing that
the largest eigenvalue of HL is positive.21
Choosing reference city k 2 L, let DL be the submatrix of D representing travel
costs within L n fkg and dkL = (dki)i2Lnfkg. Then, we can take ZL so that
HL = H1 +H2 (21)
21HL is called the reducedHessian. See, for example, Griva et al. (2009).
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where
H1 = dkL 
 1 + (dkL 
 1)0  DL; (22)
H2 = diag[(h0i(ni))i2Lnfkg] + h
0
k(nk)1
01: (23)
In the formula above, 
 denotes the Kronecker product, 1 is a vector of oneswith an
appropriate dimension, and diag(x) is the diagonal matrix having x as its diagonal
elements. For analytical convenience, we choose the left end city in support of n as
a reference city. Note that every matrix and vector is defined for support L which
is generally a subset of S. However, to simplify notations, we sometimes suppress
subscript Lwhen no confusion arises.22
In the following analysis, we exploit the fact that a support of spatial equilibrium
can be considered a downsized replica of the full support. Specifically, populated
cities in a spatial equilibrium are congregated (i.e., there is no vacant city between
any populated cities) as shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Suppose n 2  is a spatial equilibrium. Then, suppn 2 SC where
SC =
n
fi1; :::; iag  S : i j+1 = i j + 1; 1  j  a   1; a 2 S
o
: (24)
Proof. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. 
As a result, the properties of D carry over to DL. As we will see in further sections,
this significantly simplifies the analysis and enables us to obtain analytical insights.
To attain a threshold value of  above which the largest eigenvalue of HL is
positive, we invoke Weyl’s inequality that says
max(HL)  jLj 1(HL)  jLj  j(H1) +  j(H2) (25)
for 2  j  jLj 1wherei(M) is the i-th smallest eigenvalue ofmatrixM.23 Although
wemade some adjustments to account for feasibility constraints, we can see thatH1
corresponds to agglomeration forceW1 whereasH2 corresponds to dispersion force
W2. Indeed, because DL is conditionally negative definite as D is by Lemma 3, it
22For example, H1 and H2 should have been written as H1L and H2L.
23Weyl’s inequality states that p(B+C)  p+q(B)+n q(C) for q 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; n pg and p(B+C) 
p q+1(B) + q(C) for q 2 f1; 2; :::; pg where B and C are n  n symmetric matrices. See Theorem 4.3.1
and Corollary 4.3.3 of Horn and Johnson (2013).
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follows that H1 is positive definite, and thus all of its eigenvalues are also positive.
Therefore, H1 acts as the destabilizing force against interior distribution. On the
other hand, because hi is a decreasing function, all of H2’s eigenvalues, except for
one zero eigenvalue, are negative, and thus H2 acts as the stabilizing force. The
threshold value is attained when those two forces are balanced:
Proposition 1. A population distribution n 2  such that suppn = L cannot be a stable
spatial equilibrium if  > min2 jjLj 1  j 1(diag[(jh0i(ni)j)i2Lnfkg])=jLj  j(H1).
To closely examine the instability condition above, we consider the linear cost
(di j = jxi   x jj) and the exponential cost (di j = ejxi x jj   1). Moreover, to abstract away
from the spatial variation of h0i(ni), we assume h
0
i (ni) =  K=A for any i 2 S.24 Then,
we can see that HL is independent of the population distribution, and HL = HL0
whenever L;L0 2 SC and jLj = jL0j. Thus, wemay focus on the number of populated
cities in a spatial equilibrium. The following corollaries give the explicit expressions
of threshold values of  for each case:
Corollary 1.1. Suppose h0i (ni) =  K=A and di j = jxi x jj. Then, a population distribution
n 2  having R populated cities cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium if
 > l(R) 

1   cos 2
2R + 1

K2
A
: (26)
Corollary 1.2. Suppose h0i (ni) =  K=A and di j = ejxi x jj   1. Then, a population distri-
bution n 2  having R populated cities cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium if
 > e(R)  1
e2=K   1

1 + e2=K   2e1=K cos 2
R   1

K
A
: (27)
There are two remarks here. First, because e(R) and l(R) are decreasing in
R, the maximum possible number of populated cities that might constitute a stable spatial
equilibrium is decreasing in  in either of exponential and linear cases. Second,
it follows that e(K) and l(K) are increasing in K whereas e(K) ! 2A(1 + 42)
and l(K) ! 2=(2A) as K ! 1. Therefore, if  is suciently large, a population
distribution with full support cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium for any finite K.
24This can be induced through Mossay and Picard’s (2011) model. See Section 3.
16
3.2 Multiplicity of Spatial Equilibria
Wehave seen how the potential function approach generally works for discrete-
space social interaction models, and, as an illustration, we obtained an instability
condition with respect to . In deriving a sucient condition for the statement
that a population distribution cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium, we do not
have to guarantee that a population distribution is indeed a spatial equilibrium.
However, if we are interested in equilibrium properties such as the multiplicity
and stability of equilibria, we have to demonstrate that population distributions
under consideration are actually spatial equilibria. Therefore, there would be no
hope for attaining analytical observations under a general environment.
Thus, in what follows, to get clear insights into the equilibrium properties of the
discrete-space model, we adopt Mossay and Picard’s (2011) specification in which
fi(x) =   2x and di j = jxi   x jj, and exploit its linear structure. Indeed, under these
assumptions, we have
hi(ni) = fi
 A
niK

  A
niK
f 0i
 A
niK

=  niK=A (28)
for all i 2 S, and therefore the net utility from land at equilibrium is linear in n.
In this section,we compare the equilibriumproperties of ourmodelwith thoseof
Mossay and Picard’s continuous-space model. As mentioned in the introduction,
a symmetric unimodal population distribution is attained as the unique spatial
equilibrium in their model. Invoking the argument above, we would like to see
whether the uniqueness result is robust in terms of the discretization of space.
Because the total number of cities is exogenously given, we are particularly
interested in the essential multiplicity of equilibria in terms of population distri-
butions restricted to the support of spatial equilibria. As we observed, all spatial
equilibria exhibit the same population distribution over their supports, as long as
the number of populated cities is the same. For example, although there are three
stable equilibria in Figure 2(b), they should be regarded as qualitatively the same.
Therefore, we aim to find cases in which spatial equilibria with dierent numbers
of populated cities simultaneously exist.
Now that we are interested in the existence of multiple equilibria, we need to
examine equilibrium conditions. Note that, because v(n)  (vi(n))Ki=1 is linear in n,
the distribution over the support of a spatial equilibrium solves a system of linear
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equations. To simplify notations, we focus on population distribution having full
support without loss of generality. Then, observing that (2) can be expressed in
matrix form Dn, payo vector v(n) is written as
v(n) = Y1   Dn   K
A
En = Y1   Cn (29)
where E is the identity matrix with an appropriate dimension and
C = D +
K
A
E: (30)
Because n is a spatial equilibrium, there exists v 2 R such that vi(n) = v for all
i 2 S. Furthermore, the equilibrium value of w  Y   v is given by (10C 11) 1 2 R
because
w 1 = Cn) w 10C 11 = 10n = 1
where the prime means the transpose of vector or matrix. Therefore, n solves
Cn =

10C 11
 1
1: (31)
Note that the analogue argument holds for support L  S ifmatrices and vectors are
restricted to L. This implies that a spatial equilibriumwith support L is generically
unique if it exists.25 Thus, the number of equilibria is atmost one for each L  S, and
therefore, the set of spatial equilibria is finite. Furthermore, recall that populated
cities in a spatial equilibrium are congregated by Lemma 3. Therefore, we can see
that the number of spatial equilibria having R populated cities is K   R + 1 if they
exist where 1  R  K. By invoking index theory, we then obtain the following
result:
Lemma 4. If there is a spatial equilibrium n such that jsuppnj < K, then there is another
spatial equilibrium n0 such that jsuppn0j , jsuppnj.
Thus, if a spatial equilibriumhaving someunpopulated cities exists, then there is
necessarily another spatial equilibrium that is essentially dierent from the equilib-
rium. Therefore, the only situation inwhich the (essential)multiplicity of equilibria
will not arise is when the spatial equilibrium with full support uniquely exists.
25For spatial equilibria, we have to address unpopulated cities in addition to (31).
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We illustrate the multiplicity of spatial equilibria by finding cases when a spa-
tial equilibrium with full support cannot be stable even if it exists. Since every
admissible evolutionary dynamics converges to a spatial equilibrium, if the spatial
equilibrium with full support exists but is unstable, an admissible dynamic start-
ing in the unstable manifold converges to another equilibrium that must have a
dierent number of populated cities.
However, in view of Corollary 1.1, we already know that a population distri-
bution with full support cannot represent a stable spatial equilibrium if  > l(K)
where l(K) is given by (26). Therefore, we conclude the following result:
Proposition 2. Suppose h0i (ni) =  K=A and di j = jxi   x jj. Then, the spatial equilibrium
is essentially non-unique if  > l(K).
As we observed, l(K) is increasing in K but converges to 
2
2A as K ! 1. Thus, if
 > 
2
2A , the spatial equilibrium is essentially non-unique for any finite K.
4 The Limit of Discrete-Space Models
We investigated the equilibrium properties of discrete-space model in the pre-
vious section, but we have not studied any potential connections between discrete-
space and continuous-space models. In particular, a natural question to ask is
whether a sequence of the discrete-space model’s spatial equilibria converges to
the unique equilibrium of a continuous-space model as the number of cities goes
to infinity while the size of a region is fixed (or the distance between adjacent cities
vanishes). In this section, we provide a positive answer to this question. In fact,
we show that any sequence of spatial equilibria in a discrete space converges to a
single equilibrium in a continuous space.
In Mossay and Picard’s (2011) model, the unique equilibrium has ( b; b)  R
as its support where b = 2
p

2 . To make our analysis compatible with theirs, we
assume that the region is given by [ c; c] where b < c and the location of city i is
xKi =
2c
K

i   12

  c for i 2 S.26 Moreover, because they assume that the land density
is uniformly one, we let A = 2c.
26WhileMossay and Picard consider the real line for the region, we consider a finite interval. One
might think that the boundaries of our region then aect equilibrium. However, what we actually
assume is that our region is finite but large enough to contain Mossay and Picard’s equilibrium
support. As long as the region is large enough in this sense, its boundaries do not aect equilibrium.
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We start with a continuous-space model and denote the population at location
x by (x). Mossay and Picard (2011) characterize the equilibrium conditions as
(x) +

2
”(x) = 0; (32)
( b) = 0; (b) = 0;
Z b
 b
(x)dx = 1: (33)
Note that, because the general solution of (32) is an even function, ( b) = 0 ,
(b) = 0. Hence, it suces to impose ( b) = 0. Moreover, integrating both sides
of (32) over [ b; b] and invoking the population constraint R b b (x)dx = 1, we have
0( b) 0(b) = 2=. Then, because0(x) is an odd function,0( b) =  0(b) = =.
Therefore, the conditions reduce to:
(x) +

2
”(x) = 0; (34)
0( b) = 

; (35)
( b) = 0: (36)
Wewould like to show that the equilibrium conditions of a discrete-spacemodel
converge to the above ones as K !1. To this end, let us take a sequence of spatial
equilibria, and let nK be the population distribution restricted to the support of
spatial equilibrium when the total number of cities is K. By Lemma 3, we may
assume that the support of the equilibrium is
LK =
n
¯`K; ¯`K + 1; ¯`K + 2; :::; ¯`K + RK   1
o
where ¯`K; ¯`K + RK   1 2 S. Let " = 2c=K. In what follows, we approximate (xKi )
by Ki  nKi =" that is interpreted as the population density in city i. The following
lemma summarizes equilibrium conditions that nK has to satisfy:
Lemma 5. Suppose that nK is a population distribution over LK  f1; 2; :::;Kg that is the
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support of a spatial equilibrium. Then, it solves
Kj +

2"2
(Kj 1   2Kj + Kj+1) = 0 for j 2
n
¯`K + 1; ¯`K + 2; :::; ¯`K + RK   2
o
; (37)
"K¯`K +

2"
(K¯`K+1   K¯`K) =
1
2
; (38)
K¯`K + 
K
¯`K+R 1 
2"

: (39)
Note that, because xKj+1   xKj = ", (37) becomes (34), whereas (38) becomes
0(x ¯`) =


(40)
as K goes to infinity or " goes to zero where x ¯` = limK!1 xK¯`K . Moreover, because
each of K¯`K and 
K
¯`K+R 1 are nonnegative, (39) becomes
(x ¯`) = 0 (41)
as K !1. Therefore, the limiting population distribution solves dierential equa-
tion (34) with boundary conditions (40) and (41). Thus, the equilibrium conditions
of population distribution with support LK converge to the equilibrium conditions
in the continuous space only when x ¯` =  b.
However, it follows that this is always true as long as we take a sequence of
spatial equilibria. Indeed, if x ¯` ,  b, the solution to dierential scheme (34), (40),
and (41) does not satisfy the population constraint (i.e.,
R
(x)dx , 1). This means
that the population constraint does not hold either when K is suciently large,
but this contradicts the fact that we are taking a sequence of spatial equilibria. In
other words, we cannot take a sequence of spatial equilibria such that the support
does not converge to ( b; b). Therefore, equilibrium conditions (37)-(39) converge
to equilibrium conditions (34)-(36) as K !1.
In general, though, the convergence of a discrete scheme to a dierential scheme
does not necessarily imply that the solution also converges.27 However, by solving
scheme (37)-(39), we can verify that the solution of scheme (37)-(39) converges to
that of scheme (34)-(36) as K !1. We thus obtain the following result:
Proposition 3. max1iK
(xKi )   Ki  ! 0 as K !1.
27The mathematics literature including the finite dierence method addresses the relationship be-
tween dierence and dierential equations. See, for example, LeVeque (2007).
21
Observe that, in the argument above, the sequence of spatial equilibria is arbi-
trary. Thus, any sequence of spatial equilibria converges to the unique equilibrium
of the continuous-space model. Recall that spatial equilibrium in a discrete space
is generally not unique. In particular, when  is large, a spatial equilibrium is
essentially non-unique whenever K is finite (Proposition 2). Nevertheless, each
equilibrium converges to the single equilibrium as K ! 1. This means that the
set of spatial equilibria parametrized by K is upper hemi-continuous at the limit.
Furthermore, because the spatial equilibrium in the continuous space is unique,
the lower hemi-continuity is implied by the upper hemi-continuity. Therefore, the
set of spatial equilibria is continuous in K at the limit.
5 Conclusion
We studied the properties of discrete-space social interaction models by using
the potential game approach. We showed that any sequence of the discrete-space
model’s equilibria converges to the unique equilibrium of the continuous-space
model as the distance between adjacent cities vanishes. It is worth pointing out
that this result holds even though the equilibrium of discrete-space model can be
non-unique for any finite number of cities.
In this paper, we considered social interactions among a single type of agents.
Thus, a natural extension is to consider multiple types of agents. There is a rich
literature on (continuous-space) social interaction models having both consumers
and firms.28 Because of general equilibrium eects, the properties of equilibrium is
more complex than the class of models considered here. In particular, equilibrium
is generally not unique even in the continuous-space model, although the stability
of equilibria has not been explored. It is dicult to determine the stability of
equilibria in the continuous-space model, but we may be able to address this by
approximating the model with a discrete-space model.29
Finally, although we did not engage in policy discussions, the spatial equi-
librium of our model is generally not ecient because social interactions cause
externalities. Indeed, population distribution is more concentrated at social opti-
28See Chapter 6 of Fujita and Thisse (2013) and references therein.
29Blanchet et al. (2013) use the potential function(al) approach to characterize equilibria of
continuous-space models. Although their work has a great potential for further investigations of
continuous-space models, they still abstract away from stability analysis.
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mum than at market equilibrium. This is a consequence of positive externalities
in social interactions, which yields under-agglomeration. Thus, to achieve a social
optimum, it is necessary that the planner internalize those externalities. However,
because the equilibrium under such an intervention is not necessarily unique as
in a laissez-faire case, there may exist a stable equilibrium besides social optima.
Therefore, in contrast to the continuous world, the policy design to achieve a social
optimum in the discrete world is not straightforward because of the multiplicity of
equilibria. This is an important subject of future research.30
Appendix
Lemma A1. ei 2  is a spatial equilibrium if and only if   K2=A.
Proof. vi(ei)   v j(ei) = h(1)   h(0) + d ji. Therefore,
vi(ei)  v j(ei) for any j , i, h(0)   h(1)  min
j,i
d ji = =K: 
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium n in
which, for some i; j 2 suppnwith j i  2, n` = 0 for all i < ` < j. Let k 2 fi+1; ::; j 1g.
Then, because di` + dik  dk` and dk` + d jk  d j` for `  i,
iX
`=1
di`n` + dik
iX
`=1
n` 
iX
`=1
dk`n` 
iX
`=1
d j`n`   d jk
iX
`=1
n`: (42)
Similarly,
KX
`= j
d j`n` + d jk
KX
`= j
n` 
KX
`= j
dk`n` 
KX
`= j
di`n`   dik
KX
`= j
n`: (43)
30Sandholm (2007) and Fujishima (2013) consider Pigouvian tax policies in the presence of mul-
tiple equilibria.
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Without loss of generality, suppose
PK
`= j n` 
Pi
`=1 n`. Then,
KX
`=1
d j`n` 
KX
`=1
d j`n` +
KX
`= j
(di`   d j`   dik   d jk)n` (44)

KX
`=1
d j`n` +
KX
`= j
(di`   d j`   dik)n`   d jk
iX
`=1
n` 
KX
`=1
dk`n`: (45)
Therefore,
hi(ni)   h j(n j)  
KX
`=1
(di`   d j`)n` > hi(ni)   h j(0)  
KX
`=1
(di`   d j`)n`
 hi(ni)   hk(0)  
KX
`=1
(di`   dk`)n`  0 * vi(n)  vk(n):
But this contradicts i; j 2 suppn (i.e., vi(n) = v j(n)). 
Proof of Proposition 1. Because D is conditionally negative definite, it follows from
Lemma 3 that DL is also conditionally negative definite, and this further implies
that H1 is positive definite. Thus, all of H1’s eigenvalues are positive. On the other
hand, the eigenvalues of h0k(nk)1
01 are (jLj   1)h0k(nk) and 0, so the matrix has exactly
one negative eigenvalue because h0i(n) < 0 for any i 2 S. Thus, byWeyl’s inequality,
i(H2)  i 1(diag[(h0i (ni))i2Lnfkg]).
Then, by invoking Weyl’s inequality for H1 +H2, we obtain
max(HL)  jLj 1(HL)  jLj  j(H1) +  j(H2) (46)
 jLj  j(H1) +  j 1(diag[(h0i (ni))i2Lnfkg]) (47)
where 2  j  jLj   1. Because ni > 0 for all i 2 L,  j 1(diag[(h0i(ni))i2Lnfkg]) 2 ( 1; 0)
for 2  j  jLj   1. Therefore, we obtain the stated result. 
Proof of Corollaries 1.1 and 1.2. Suppose h0i (ni) =  K=A. Because the Hessian does
not depend on population distribution, we may focus on the number of populated
cities by letting HL = HR for any L 2 SC such that jLj = R.
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Suppose di j = jxi   x jj. In this case, we can directly compute the inverse of H1 as
H 11 =
K
2
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
2  1
 1 2  1
 1 2  1
: : : : : : : : :
 1 2  1
 1 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (48)
This is an (R  1) (R  1)-dimensional tridiagonal Toeplitz matrix where the lower
right corner is perturbed. Yueh and Cheng (2008) attain explicit expressions for
the eigenvalues of this class of matrices. Invoking their results, it follows that
p(H 11 ) = K

1   cos 2p2R+1

. Thus, p(H1) = 1K

1   cos 2(R p)2R+1
 1
. Then, because
max(HR)  R 1(H1)   K=A, we obtain l(R).
Next, suppose di j = ejxi x jj   1, and let  = exp(1=K). Then, DR =  R   101where
 R =
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1  2    R 2
 1     R 3
2  1    R 4
:::
:::
:::
: : :
:::
R 2 R 3 R 4    1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (49)
Unfortunately, the eigenvalues of H1 are no longer easily attainable, as opposed
to the linear case. Thus, instead, we obtain the eigenvalues of  R, and attain a
condition stronger than the one in Proposition 1.
The inverse of  R is
  1R =
1
1   2
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1  
  1 + 2  
: : : : : : : : :
  1 + 2  
  1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (50)
This is a tridiagonal Toeplitzmatrixwhere the upper left and lower right corners are
perturbed. On the basis of the results of Yueh andCheng (2008), we havep(   1R ) =
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1
2 1

1 + 2   2 cos (p 1)R 1

, and thus p(  R) = (2   1)

1 + 2   2 cos (R p 1)R 1
 1
.
On the other hand, the eigenvalues of 10R 11R 1 are R   1 and 0. Thus, the matrix
does not have a negative eigenvalue, and hence i( DR)  i(  R).
The eigenvalues of dkL
1+(dkL
1)0 areP j2Lnfkg dkj pR   1qP j2Lnfkg d2kj and 0. By
Ho¨lder’s inequality,
P
j2Lnfkg dkj 
p
R   1
qP
j2Lnfkg d2kj, thus the matrix has at most
one negative eigenvalue. Hence, i(H1)  i 1( DR). Then, because max(HR) 
R 2(H1) + 1(diag[(h0i(ni))i2Lnfkg])  R 3(  R)   K=A, we obtain e(R). 
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose, to the contrary, that every spatial equilibrium has R
populated cities where R < K. To show the result, we use index theory. Define the
index of a spatial equilibrium having L as its support by
indL =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 1 if detHL > 0;
0 if detHL = 0;
1 if detHL < 0;
(51)
where detHL is the determinant ofHL. Then, indices of each spatial equilibria must
sum up to one by the index theorem of Simsek et al. (2007).31 However, because
HL = HL0 whenever L; L0 2 SC and jLj = jL0j, it follows from Lemma 3 that the total
value of indices of spatial equilibria having R populated cities is either K   R + 1,
 (K   R + 1), or 0. In either case, it is not one. 
Proof of Lemma 5. To simplify notations, we omit superscript k of LK; ¯`K, and RK.
Recall from Section 3.1 that nK must solve a system of linear equations. Specifically,
multiplying both sides of CLnK = wK 1 by 1D
 1
L from the left, n
K solves
E +

"
D 1L

nK = wKD 1L 1 (52)
31Simsek et al. (2007) establish the index theorem that is applicable to the KKT set of nonlinear
programming (See, in particular, Proposition 5.2). Their theorem is relevant to us because the set of
spatial equilibria coincides with that of KKT points of the potential’s maximization problem.
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where wK = (10C 1L 1)
 1. Note that, because jLj = R,
D 1L =
1
2"
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1
R 1   1 1 1R 1
1  2 1
1  2 1
: : : : : : : : :
1  2 1
1
R 1 1
1
R 1   1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (53)
Then, we have
"Kj +

2"

K( j)   Kj +
1
R   1(
K
¯` + 
K
¯`+R 1)

=
1
"
1
R   1w
K for j 2 f ¯`; ¯`+ R   1g;
(54)
Kj +

2"2
(Kj 1   2Kj + Kj+1) = 0 for j 2 f ¯`+ 1; ¯`+ 2; :::; ¯`+ R   2g; (55)
where ( ¯`) = ¯`+ 1 and ( ¯`+ R   1) = ¯`+ R   2. Summing the first and last rows of
CLnK = wK 1 in each of left-hand and right-hand sides, we have
wK =
"
2
(R   1) + 
2
(K¯` + 
K
¯`+R 1): (56)
Substituting this into (54), we obtain
"K¯` +

2"
(K¯`+1   K¯` ) =
1
2
: (57)
The analogue relationship holds for j = ¯`+ R   1. Moreover, because ¯`  1; ¯`+ R <
suppnK,
PR
j=1 jnK¯` 1+ j  wK and
PR
j=1( ¯`+ 1   j)nK¯` 1+ j  wK. Hence, by (56),
2wK   "(R + 1) = (K¯` + K¯`+R 1)   2"  0: (58)
Therefore, the equilibrium conditions are summarized as (37)-(39). 
Proof of Proposition 3. Multiplying the LHS of (37) by 2"2=, we get
Ki+1   2aKKi + Ki 1 = 0: (59)
where aK = 1 "2=. It follows that the solution property crucially depends on the
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sign of DK = (aK)2   1. Because we are interested in the case where K is suciently
large, we assume DK < 0. Then, the solution is represented as
Ki = C
K
1 cos(!
Ki) + CK2 sin(!
Ki) (60)
= CK cos(!Ki   K) (61)
where CK =
q
(CK1 )
2 + (CK2 )
2, !K = cos 1(aK) with 0  !K < 2, and K satisfies
CK cos K = CK1 and C
K sin K = CK2 . Because 
K
i , which is given by cosine function
(61), is nonnegative for all i 2 L, we assume [!K ¯`  K; !K( ¯`+ R   1)   K]  [ 2 ; 2 ]
without loss of generality.
By symmetry, K¯` = 
K
¯`+R 1. Thus, 
K = !
K(2 ¯`+R 1)
2 . Then, because " =
xK¯`+R 1 xK¯`
R 1 ,
1
CK

2"
(K¯`+1   K¯` ) =

2"

cos(!K( ¯`+ 1)   K)   cos(!K ¯`  K)

(62)
=
!K(R   1)
2(xK¯`+R 1   xK¯` )
sin

!K(R 2)
2

sin

!K
2

!K=2
: (63)
Note that limK!1 K¯`+R 1 = 0 ) limK!1!K(R   1) = . Moreover, limK!1!K = 0
because aK ! 1 as K !1. Therefore, by (38), CK ! (x ¯`+R 1 x ¯`) as K !1.
Now, fix location x. Then,
CK cos

!K
1 + K
2
+
x
"

  K

= CK cos
266664!K"
0BBBB@x   xK¯`+R 1 + xK¯`2
1CCCCA377775 (64)
! (x ¯`+R 1   x ¯`)

cos
 

2
2x   x ¯`+R 1   x ¯`
x ¯`+R 1   x ¯`
!
(65)
as K ! 1. Then, because x ¯`+R 1 = b and x ¯` =  b, we obtain 4b cos


2bx

. This is the
solution to scheme (34)-(36), and we thus complete the proof. 
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